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Pope: Interspousal Immunity in Tort: Its Relevance, Constitutionality,

NOTES
INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN TORT: ITS RELEVANCE,
CONSTITUTIONALITY, AND ROLE IN CONFLICT OF LAWS*

The Constitution and laws of the United States recognize that a
married woman is a person and an individual and that she is entitled
to the same protection of the law as other individuals regardless of
ancient provisions of the common law.1
The common law rule that spouses cannot sue each other in tort for
personal injuries is under heavy attack. 2 A number of jurisdictions have
abolished interspousal immunity and now permit husbands and wives to sue
each other on any cause of action. s This note will examine the immunity rule,
suggest its abolition, and propose a solution for the conflict of laws problem
inevitably created by abolition of the rule.
HISTORICAL AND

CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

RULE

The underpinning for the interspousal immunity concept may be trace4
able to the Biblical concept that the husband and wife "shall be one flesh."
By the era of Blackstone the law had embodied the concept thusly: "By
the very being
marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law ....
or at least
the
marriage,
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
whose
under
husband:
of
the
is incorporated and consolidated into that
is a
."
This
wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing ....
classical statement of the "unity" fiction that husband and wife merge upon
marriage into an entity standing as one before the law. This fiction, however,
is completely one-sided and has been succinctly summarized: "[M]an and
wife are one- but the man is the one."6 The unity fiction seems to have
played the greatest role in the treatment of interspousal immunity in the

OThis note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the best student note submitted in the Fall 1968 quarter.
1. Wyche, C. J., in Alexander v. Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925, at 928 (W.D.S.C. 1956).
2. See, e.g., Kleinfelter, Interspousal Immunity in Pennsylvania -A Concept in Evolution, 69 DICK. L. REv. 143 (1965); Comment, Interspousal Immunity Rule and the Effect
of Liability Insurance in Automobile Accidents, 11 S.D.L. Rav. 144, 151 (1966).
3. See cases collected at 43 A.L.R.2d 647 (1955).
4. Williams, The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 MODERN L. Rv. 16 (1947),
citing Genesis 2:24.
5. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
6. Williams, supra note 4, at 17. Pollock and Maitland, however, do not regard the
"unity of person" fiction as controlling. They see the husband as the guardian of the wife.
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrTLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAw 406 (2d ed. 1905). This view
has not played a significant role in the development of the immunity rule in the United
States. See infra note 7.
[484]
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United States. Courts have consistently relied upon the unity concept in
7
their decisions.
The common law denied to the wife the capacity to contract and the
right to sue or be sued in her own name.8 The denial of the right to sue
or be sued seems to have been sufficient to explain why spouses could not sue
each other.9 However, the unity fiction was simultaneously advanced to
support the proposition that if two individuals were merged upon marriage
into a single entity, the entity could not logically contract with or sue itself.10
Modem society has gradually extended to the wife the right to contract and
the right to sue or be sued,:" but the unity fiction has been dragged along
into the twentieth century where it functions as a handy prop to support
what some courts consider to be better policy in interspousal actions.
The unity theory has been weakened by the Married Women's Property
Acts,' 2 which dissolve the fictional unity as to interspousal property actions.
As Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Thompson v.
Thompson, 3 by construing the Married Women's Property Acts to allow
interspousal property actions but to prohibit interspousal tort actions, the
court was allowing "a married woman to sue her husband separately, in
tort, for the recovery of her property, but denying her the right or privilege
to sue him separately, in tort, for damages arising from his brutal assaults
upon her person." A minority of jurisdictions have held that the Married
Women's Property Acts have totally destroyed the unity concept.34 Conceptually, the minority view seems the more rational approach, since it is
difficult to explain why husband and wife are merged vis-h-vis interspousal
personal injury actions, but are allowed to act as strangers to each other in
such matters as property and contractual rights and obligations. While
marital harmony is the rationale most frequently advanced to justify tort
immunity,' 5 interspousal squabbles over property can be as bitter and
disruptive of marital tranquility as are conflicts involving personal injuries.
The movement in the United States is unquestionably in the direction
of permitting interspousal tort actions for personal injuries.' 6 Since the unity

7. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 614 (1910); Corren v. Corren, 47
So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950). For an excellent short summary and list of sources on the historical background of immunity see Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity

-

California

Follows the Trend, 36 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 456, 458-61 (1963).
8. McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 ViLL. L. REv. 303, 305 (1959).

9. Id. at 305. "Mt would follow that she could not contract or enter into transactions
with her husband, or sue, or be sued by him."
10. Id. It seems clear that the unity fiction was unnecessary to achieve the original goal
of interspousal immunity.
11. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §708.08 (1967).
12. F1A.. STAT. ch. 708 (1967) embodies the Florida act and is representative.
18. 218 US. 611, 623 (1910).
14. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 35 (1917).
15. Comment, Interspousal Immunity - Time for a Reappraisal, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 550,
554 (1966).
16. Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity - California Follows the Trend, 36 So.

CAr. L. Rxv. 456 nA (1963).
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concept has been weakened by the Married Women's Property Acts, and
since no court could reasonably assert that the modern social order permits
husbands and wives to be considered "one," the only support remaining for
the immunity rule is a vaguely stated notion of public policy that seems more
intuitive than rational.
REASON

VERSUS

"POLICY"

The marital harmony argument made in support of interspousal im17
munity has been seriously undercut by the Married Women's Property Acts. '
Marital bliss may be more disturbed by a thwarted desire to recover than
by recovery itself.' 8 Additionally, by the time a lawsuit between husband and
wife is contemplated or initiated there is probably little domestic tranquility
remaining to be protected. 19 Thus, the most popular of the policy arguments
used to support immunity seems hollow. In Corren v. Corren,20 Florida's
leading case upholding interspousal immunity, the court grounded its deci2
sion on the unity concept and used the marital harmony argument ' to
2
support that concept.
When the immunity issue is squarely presented, often on first impression,
courts frequently see the spectre of marital trivia inundating the judicial
system. This prospect was one of the arguments advanced by the United States
Supreme Court in support of immunity in Thompson v. Thompson.3 Court
dockets, especially in larger cities, have undoubtedly become more crowded
since Thompson. It is therefore easy to understand the natural reluctance of
courts to make decisions that might result in further crowding. However,
24
there are at least eighteen jurisdictions that have abolished immunity,
25
and in none is there any evidence to support the fear of inundation. Even
if some increase in spurious interspousal suits were noted, it is not sound
judicial policy to prohibit all actions of a particular type because some might
be frivolous or fraudulent. If total exclusion of such actions were the policy,
then the courts would surely have to close. Further, such a policy would be
an admission that the judicial system is unable to distinguish between
spurious and legitimate claims. Thus, as the evidence accumulates, it is
increasingly apparent that fear of spurious claims likewise does not support
retention of the immunity rule.
It is also claimed that the repudiation of immunity will facilitate fraudulent claims against insurance companies 26 and increase liability insurance
17. E.g.,

FLA. STAT. ch. 708 (1967).
18. Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Mo. 1955).
19. Comment, Marital Disability in Personal Tort Actions, 14 U. MuAMI L. REv. 99,
105 (1959).
20. 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
21. Id. at 776.
22. Id. at 775.
23. 218 U.S. 611, 617 (1910).
24. Comment, supra note 16, at 456 n.4.
25. Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 693, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962).
26. Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 311, 287 P.2d 572, 583 (1955).
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rates.27 In response to the former, the Washington supreme court has
promulgated a sounder judicial policy:[T]he fact that there may be greater opportunity for fraud or collusion
in one class of cases than another does not warrant courts of law in
dosing the door to all cases of that class.... Courts will not immunize
tortfeasors from liability in a whole class of cases because of the possibility of fraud, but will depend upon the legislature to deal with the
problem as a question of public policy.
An additional hinderance to collusive lawsuits, the automobile guest statute,
is already law in many states. 29 These statutes require that a guest in an
automobile show more than ordinary negligence- in order to establish a
cause of action against the owner or operator. In response to fears of rate
increases for liability insurance, one recent survey3 ' indicates that the insurance commissioners of states that have abolished immunity could report no
evidence of a "significant or noticeable" increase in liabibity insurance rates
resulting from the abrogation of interspousal immunity. One, the state of
Wisconsin, reported that rates had been influenced, but could produce no
supporting authority.32
In Thompson v. Thompson33 the United States Supreme Court suggested
criminal prosecution, divorce, and alimony as adequate interspousal remedies.
This support for immunity places the court in the inconsistent position of
suggesting the drastic, family-destroying remedy of divorce as sufficient, yet
proclaiming a broad policy of domestic tranquility. Scrutiny of these policy
considerations forces the conclusion that "policy" is frequently used ex post
facto to becloud the fact that a court is unwilling to change a court-created
concept based upon social conditions in an era distinct from our own.
THE IMMUNITY RuLE IN FLORIDA

In Corren v. Corren,34 Florida's leading case on the immunity issue, the
Florida supreme court refused to hold that the Married Women's Property
Act 5 completely abrogated the common law doctrine of immunity. The court
based its decision upon the unity fiction, in support of which it expressed
fear that the tranquility of the home would be destroyed by abrogation of

27. Comment, Interspousal Immunity Rule and the Effect of Liability Insurance in
Automobile Accidents, 11 S.D.. REv. 144, 151 (1966).
28. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149, 155 (1952).
29. E.g., FLA. STAT. §320.59 (1967).
30. Id. The Florida statute requires a showing of gross negligence or willful and
wanton misconduct.
31. Comment, supra note 27, at 151 n.47.
32. Id.

33. 218 U.S. 611, 619 (1910).
34.
35.

47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
Specifically, FA. STAT. §§708.08, .09 (1967).
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immunity in tort.3 6 The court placed the burden for any such "revolutionary"
change solely upon the legislature.37
In an earlier case, Webster v. Snyder,38 the plaintiff, injured by her fianc6
driving his mother's automobile, sued the owner in tort. The court held that
the plaintiff's marriage to the driver after the accident abated her cause of
action against the son, but that the defendant mother was liable for her
son's negligence under master-servant theory. In May v. Palm Beach Chemical
Co.,3 9 the court refused to allow plaintiff's husband's operation of a company
automobile on a private mission with plaintiff to bar her from suing the
company. The court reasoned that in Florida the owner of an automobile
as a matter of law always stands in the relation of supervisor to anyone whom
he voluntarily allows to use his car. In this regard the court considered the
marital immunity issue "subsidiary." 40 Only in such situations as May and
Webster, where third parties are involved with the husband and wife, has
Florida to some extent skirted the immunity rule.
In Shiver v. Sessions4 the court took a step forward by indicating that
the Corren42 court had based its decision upon a policy of domestic tranquility rather than upon the remainder of the unity fiction. 43 One observer
maintained that this switch to public policy as a conceptual underpinning for
the immunity rule would open the door to further modifications or even to
judicial abrogation of the rule. 4 4 In Amendola v. Amendola,45 the Second
District Court of Appeal, perhaps through semantic carelessness, injected the
possibility of further softening of judicial rigidity on the immunity issue.
The court held a woman's right to sue her husband for a prenuptial tort
committed by him "was abated or suspended by the marriage." 46 Earlier,
Webster v. Snyder47 simply held the right of action to be abated. Because the
term "abate" implies total extinction and destruction' s whereas the term
"suspend" implies only a temporary cessation, 49 there was an implication
that under some circumstances the right of action would once again be
valid if the marriage were terminated. To date, there has been no resolution
of this ambiguity by the Florida supreme court, but a federal court, applying
Florida law in Gaston v. Pittman" has interpreted the language of Amendola
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
spousal
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

47 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1950).
Id.
103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932).
77 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1955).
Id. at 473.
80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955).
47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
The Married Women's Property Acts dissolved the fictional unity as to interproperty actions. Supra, note 12.
Comment, supra note 19, at 109.
121 So. 2d 805 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932).
BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 15 (4th ed. 1952).

49. Id. at 1615. For an interpretation of this semantic difficulty by a federal court
dealing with Florida law see Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645, 648-50 (N.D. Fla. 1968).
50. 285 F. Supp. 645, 649-50 (N.D. Fla. 1968).
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to mean that the right of action for a premarital tort is abated (that is,
totally extinguished and not able to be revived) if a valid marriage is consummated, but only suspended if the marriage is invalid and subject to
annulment. In Gaston the plaintiff wife sued after divorce for a tort committed before marriage. As the court there indicated, all of the cases previously relied upon by Florida courts involved either suits during coverture
for a marital or premarital tort, or actions after divorce for a tort committed
during marriage. 51
If the Amendola 52 decision raised any hopes for a slight relaxation of
the immunity rule in Florida, these hopes were dashed by the Florida
supreme court's ruling in Bencomo v. Bencomo.s3 Plaintiff, the divorced wife
of defendant, brought action for a tort committed during coverture. She
argued that sections 1, 4, and 1254 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida
constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution guaranteed her a right of action against her former husband.
Choosing to omit a discussion of the Florida and United States constitutional
questions raised, the court fell back upon the "unity" fiction of Corren v.
Corren,55 in spite of its opinion in Shiver v. Sessions6 indicating that the
basis of Corren was not the unity concept, but rather the policy of preserving
domestic tranquility.57 Ignoring its remarks in Shiver, the court in Bencomo
flatly stated: "This court has long been committed to the proposition that
one spouse can not sue the other because under the common law, they are one
person."S8 The Bencomo court also reiterated the domestic tranquility argu51. Id. at 650.
52. 121 So. 2d 805 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
53. 200 So. 2d 171 (Fla.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
54. These provisions were contained in the Florida Constitution of 1885. On November
5, 1968, a new constitution was ratified by general election, and on January 7, 1969, the

new constitution [hereinafter cited as new constitution] became effective. The following
were the provisions of the Constitution of 1885 upon which the plaintiff in Bencomo relied.
Corresponding provisions of the new constitution are indicated:
Section 1: "All men are equal before the law, and have certain inalienable rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing happiness and obtaining safety."

(Section 2 of the new

constitution provides: "All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable
rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness,
to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property ....")
Section 4: "All courts in this state shall be open, so that every person for any injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of
law, and right and justice shall be administired [sic] without sale, denial or delay" (emphasis added). (Section 21 of the new constitution provides: "The courts shall be open to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay.-)
Section 12: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law .. .." (Section 9 of the new constitution provides: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law ...
55. 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
56. 80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955).
57. Id. at 906.
58. 200 So. 2d 171, 172 (Fla. 1967) (emphasis added).
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ment and placed the burden for any change of the immunity rule solely
upon the legislature.

59

The dissenting opinion,60 however, offered a slight concession. Justice
Ervin would approve a small departure from the immunity rule to the
extent that divorced spouses should be permitted to sue each other for
intentional torts occurring during the marriage. Nevertheless, he indicated
that: "[T]here is some justification for retaining the common law barrier
so long as the marriage relation exists ....
J61
justification took the form
of a presumption that in accordance with marriage vows the guilty spouse
would voluntarily make amends, but if not, the aggrieved spouse could resort
to divorce proceedings. This reasoning overlooks the spouse who refuses to
make amends - possibly because of his knowledge of the common law rule of
immunity. It also overlooks the spouse who does not wish to endure the
trauma of divorce, but merely wishes redress for a wrong - possibly because
of the existence of insurance for which the offending spouse has paid. The
net result of even Justice Ervin's policy is to force a spouse to choose a much
more drastic remedy than is called for, or to give up any hope of having
judicial assistance in redressing the wrong.
Florida has retreated to the common law unity doctrine as the basis for
its interspousal immunity rule. That this rationale is the real basis for
Florida's rule has been recently recognized by a federal court applying
Florida law.62 This summary represents the current state of the immunity
issue, and there is no indication that the courts are willing to take the
initiative to change it.
DOES THE IMMUNITY RULE VIOLATE THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?

In Alexander v. Alexander,63 an interesting and provocative decision rendered in 1956, a federal district court in South Carolina was confronted in an

interspousal diversity action with the issue of whether the common law
immunity rule had been abrogated in Florida by the state constitution."
This issue has been ignored by the commentators and perfunctorily glossed
over by both Florida and other federal courts. 65
A Florida statute specifically provides:6 6
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and
not a local nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down
to the fourth day of July, 1776, are declared to be of force in this
59. Id. at 173.
60. Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So. 2d 171, 172 (Fla.1967).
61. Id. at 176.
62. Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645, 646 (N.D. Fla. 1968).
63. 140 F. Supp. 925 (W.D.S.C. 1956).
64. The court specifically dealt with section 4, Declaration of Rights, of the Florida
Constitution of 1885. See note 54 supra.
65. See Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Fla. 1968); Locklair v. Locklair, 256
F. Supp. 530 (D.S.C. 1966); Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1967).
66. FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1967).
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state; provided, the said statutes and common law be not inconsistent
with the constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of
the legislature of this state.
In addition, the Florida supreme court held in Waller v. First Savings & Trust
Co.67 that the common law could be abrogated by the Florida constitution.
Specifically, the court held that section 4 of the Declaration of Rights
abrogated the English common law rule that a cause of action in tort died
with the tortfeasor.68 Subsequently, in Matthews v.McCain,69 the court flatly
held: "The Constitution and statutes of Florida must of course control, and
take precedence over the common law when there are any inconsistencies
70
between them."
There is an inherent dash between the common law interspousal immunity rule and the mandate of the Declaration of Rights that "the courts
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay."7 1 The argument that divorce
72
provides adequate redress for interspousal injuries has been found wanting.
Nevertheless, the Florida court has been unwilling even to discuss this
constitutional issue, although regarding the issue of the husband's complete
control over his wife's property, the court was willing as early as 1913 to
find that the common law rule had been modified by article XI, section 1,
of the Florida Constitution of 1885.73 Apparently, some form of selective
constitutional interpretation is at work. Policy considerations can sometimes outweigh even the state constitution.
This dash between the Declaration of Rights and the common law was

67. 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1937).
68. Id. at 1034, 138 So. at 784.
69. 125 Fla. 840, 170 So. 323 (1936).
70. Id. at 851-52, 170 So. at 327.
71. FLA. CoNsr. DecI. of Rights §21. The corresponding provision in the Florida
Constitution of 1885 was reflected in section 4, Declaration of Rights and provided that:
"[Every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall
have remedy ....
"
72. See text at notes 61-62 supra. For an example of this rule at work see text at notes
84-92 infra.
73. Florida Citrus Exch. v. Grisham, 65 Fla. 46, 61 So. 123 (1913). Article XI, section
1, of the Florida Constitution of 1885 provided: "All property, real and personal, of a
wife owned by her before marriage, or lawfully acquired afterward by gift, devise, bequest,
descent, or purchase, shall be her separate property, and the same shall not be liable for
the debts of her husband without her consent given by some instrument in writing executed according to the law respecting conveyances by married women." This provision has
been replaced in the new constitution by a sweeping provision emphasizing total spousal
equality as to property matters. Article X, section 5, provides: "There shall be no distinction between married women and married men in the holding, control, disposition, or
encumbering of their property, both real and personal; except that dower or curtesy may
be established and regulated by law." This provision provides for the enactment of curtesy
rights for the husband. These rights correspond to a wife's dower rights. The Florida
supreme court had previously held that the lack of specific statutory authorization meant
that no right of curtesy existed in the state of Florida. Ruesga v. Diaz, 159 Fla. 236, 81
So. 2d 396 (1947).
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raised and cogently discussed in Alexander v. Alexander,7 4 which appears
to be the only such decision of record on this issue. The argument was
definitely presented to the Florida supreme court in Bencomo v. Bencomo,7 5
but the court dealt with it only indirectly, stating that the court "had no
way of knowing why [the Alexander court] elected to depart from the rule
previously announced in this state, but nevertheless [would] still adhere to
[its] former decisions and reject the construction adopted by the South
Carolina Federal court." 76 There should have been, however, no confusion
concerning the Alexander decision. The federal court specifically explained
how it found the immunity rule abrogated by the Florida constitution: "[N]o
case has been cited and I have found none where the Supreme Court of
Florida has held that the common law has not been abrogated either by
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, or by the Constitution of the State of Florida." 7' 7 Nevertheless, the
Florida court found no conflict between the guarantees of the Declaration
of Rights and the interspousal immunity rule. 8 The Bencomo decision,
therefore, has the effect of holding that under certain circumstances the
common law unity fiction developed in England may be allowed to take
precedence over the Florida constitution.
Based upon section 2 of the new Florida Declaration of Rights7 9 and upon
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, there is also an
equal protection argument against the immunity rule. Equal protection was
apparenly raised in Bencomo ° but was not discussed in the opinion. The
federal court in Alexander,1 found the immunity rule a violation of equal
protection, but failed to devote any significant discussion to it. In Locklair
v. Locklair,8 2 another federal district court in South Carolina expressed
skepticism concerning the Alexander decision and saw no denial of equal
83
protection since the immunity rule applies equally to husband and wife.
The conclusion overlooks the inequality vis-4-vis third parties. If husband
74. 140 F. Supp. 925 (W.D.S.C. 1956). The specific provision was of the old constitution, but the slightly altered language of section 21 of the new Declaration of Rights
guarantees the same fundamental right of redress as did section 4 of the old Declaration
of Rights. See note 54 supra. The new constitution's thrust toward total spousal freedom
of action as to property matters is unmistakable. It would seem anomalous to insist upon
total spousal freedom of action in property matters, yet allow an archaic fictional unity
to bar any such freedom as to personal injuries.
75. 200 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1967). See text supra at notes 58-54.
76. Id. at 174.
77. 140 F. Supp. 925, 928 (W.D.S.C. 1956).
78. Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So. 2d 171, 174 (Fla. 1967).
79. "All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable rights.
(emphasis added). Previously, section 1, Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution of
1885 provided: "All men are equal before the law ....... (emphasis added). The shift
from "men" to "natural persons" indicates another expression of the intent to achieve unmistakable equality between men and women. See note 73 supra.
80. 200 So. 2d 171, 172 (Fla. 1967).
81. See text at note 1 supra.
82. 256 F. Supp. 530 (D.S.C. 1966).
88. Id. at 533.
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or wife injures the other, the injured party has no cause of action. But were
the tortfeasor a third party, clearly the plaintiff would have a cause of action
for injuries identical in both cases.
The brutal fashion in which the interspousal immunity rule can operate
and the fallacies of the arguments usually employed in support of the rule are
amply revealed in the recent decision of Bullard v. Bullard. 4 In Bullard
there was first a marital discord whereupon the defendant wife moved out
of the marital home. She then returned to the home without invitation or
announcement and with the aid of a pistol permanently disabled her husband
causing him to be unable to continue gainful employment. 85 The wife was
convicted and confined on a criminal charge of aggravated assault. Upon
release, she obtained gainful employment and was so employed at the time of
the present action. Her husband obtained a divorce and custody of their
ten-year old son. He also requested, but was denied, the wife's title and
equity in the marital home (valued at 3,380 dollars).86 The trial court held
it "had no choice ... but to determine the title to the marital home passed
upon divorce, to the parties as tenants in common." 87 The husband was
awarded the use and occupancy of the home for as long as it was occupied
as a home by him and his son. There was also a problem concerning the
ownership of the 8,000 dollars in life savings, which defendant took with her
when she departed from the marital home. The court, after explicitly
recognizing that a tort action would not lie and that Florida does not permit
a husband to receive alimony 8s remanded the case for further consideration
of the "equities" involved.
Even if the lower court exercised its equitable powers to the fullest,89
the most the husband could receive would be full title to the modest dwelling
and the 8,000 dollars in savings. The husband, whose only property interest
after divorce was his share in the marital home and whose sole source of
income was Social Security payments, 90 was stripped by an anachronistic
carryover from early English law of the one remedy that might have been
able to compensate him for his loss of earning capacity and his pain and
suffering. Furthermore, he was deprived of the most practical means of
securing the support necessary to rear his son. Even the most devout defender
of the immunity rule must admit that this is an unjust result.
The decision in Bullard does not meet the mandate of section 21 of the
new Declaration of Rights: "The courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial
or delay."91 Although plaintiff husband may have obtained some vengeful
satisfaction from seeing his wife placed in jail, has the revenge in any way
84. 195 So. 2d 876 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
85. Id. at 877.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 879. Clearly, alimony is no remedy for a husband under this rule.
A report reflecting results on remand could not be located.
Bullard v. Bullard, 195 So. 2d 876, 878 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
See note 54 supra.
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compensated him for the results of his permanent disability? In what way
has the plaintiff been compensated by the divorce, especially in light of
Florida's prohibition of a husband's receiving alimony?92 What marital
harmony would a suit in tort disturb? The Bullard decision clearly points
out the fallaciousness of the most popular reasons usually cited in support
of immunity. The final irony and injustice of this outmoded rule stands out
when one considers that if the defendant had been a mere girl friend or
fiance6, or if plaintiff and defendant had been residing together out of
wedlock, plaintiff would have had an adequate remedy.
A

SUGGESTED REMEDY

In Corren v. Corren9- and again in Bencomo v. Bencomo 94 the Florida

supreme court placed the sole burden for any change of the immunity rule
upon the legislature. Many courts take this position. 95 If the rule had been
expressly enacted by statute and supported by the decisional law of the
courts of a jurisdiction, the reluctance to change the rule by judicial fiat
could be more easily understood. But interspousal immunity is a judicially
created rule. The more compelling argument has been stated by the California
supreme court: "The rule was originally formulated by this court in reliance
upon a now outmoded common law rule, and if this court becomes convinced
that the rule is unwise it should see fit to change it."96 To place the responsibility upon the legislature is for the court in effect to say that courts
develop rules in response to historical and social circumstances, but when
those circumstances change, courts remain trapped by their own rules, even
though the rules are no longer relevant.
The problem of who is to alter outmoded laws is broader than the single
issue of immunity here considered. The allocation of this duty seems sometimes to be more an article of belief or faith than a process of rational choice.
Nevertheless, when the outmoded rule is a creature of the judiciary and
when there is a strong argument that the rule runs counter to the Florida
and the Federal Constitutions,9 7 it would seem to be clearly within the
competence of the court to reinterpret its former decisions.
Interspousal immunity, a legalistic, technical concept springing from
the Middle Ages, may well be the type of issue that courts should take upon
themselves to change. Legislatures tend to devote their attention to more
spectacular matters that command the attention of a maximum number of
voters. Although interspousal immunity is bound to draw some public

92. Bullard v. Bullard, 195 So. 2d 876, 879 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). Note that Justice
Ervin in Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So. 2d 171, 174 (Fla. 1967), suggested that divorce was
an adequate remedy for an aggrieved spouse.
93. 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
94. 200 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1967).
95. Comment, Interspousal Immunity - Time for a Reappraisal, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 550,
553 (1966).
96. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 242, 317 P.2d 613, 633 (1957).
97. See text at notes 71-83 supra.
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attention, it does not seem to be the kind of politically charged issue that
courts should avoid because of surrounding emotion.
Nevertheless, the Florida supreme court has so firmly placed itself in the
position of leaving all reform to the legislative branch that reversal may
now be too difficult. Recently, a federal district court judge voiced this
support for Florida's approach: 98
Florida's position is that the legislature, if it wishes to change the
common law doctrine, should say so dearly and unequivocably. I
have unsuccessfully resisted the temptation to add to this opinion the
unnecessary comment that, to me, such position is sound. Even the
legal writers advocating change recognize and admit the problems
involved. . . . Those problems properly are for legislative, and not
judicial, consideration.
Since these words seem also to reflect the unshakable attitude of the
Florida judiciary, the Florida legislature should examine this question in
detail and enact legislation that will "clearly and unequivocably" abolish
this anachronistic remnant of the common law. The legislatures of three
states have already so acted, 99 although in the approximately fifteen other
nonimmunity jurisdictions the judiciary has abolished the rule. 0 0
THE

CONFLICr OF LAWS PROBLEM ARISING WITH THE ABOLITION OF IMMUNITY

An immediate problem confronting courts in a jurisdiction that has
abolished interspousal immunity is the "choice-of-law" rule to be followed
when a husband and wife from an immunity jurisdiction become involved
in a transaction creating an interspousal personal injury action in a nonimmunity jurisdiction. The broad question is: Which law is to control? It
is readily apparent that this problem would quickly arise in a state such as
Florida, in which a high number of out-of-state transients are constantly
present.
In recent years this area of conflict of laws has been characterized by a
high degree of turbulence.' 0 ' Dawson v. Dawson'0 2 reflects the traditional
disposition of conflict of laws issues in interspousal tort actions. Husband and
wife, citizens of Alabama, where interspousal personal injury actions were
permitted, had an automobile accident in Mississippi where such suits were
prohibited. When the wife sued the husband for negligence in Alabama, the
98. Gaston v. Pittman, 285 F. Supp. 645, at 646 n.2 (ND. Fla. 1968).
99. N.Y. GEN. OBaGATIONs LAW §3-313 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §52-5.1 (Supp.
1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § §246.07-.075 (1957).

100. See cases collected in Comment, Interspousal Immunity - Time for Reappraisal,
27 Omo ST. L.J. 550, at 551-52 nn.6 & 12.
101. See, e.g., Felix, Interspousal Immunity in the Conflict of Laws: Automobile Accident Claims, 53 CoNELL.. L. Rxv. 406 (1968); Jayme, Interspousal Immunity: Revolution
and Counterrevolution in American Tort Conflicts, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 307 (1967); Whitman,
Conflict of Spousal Immunity Laws: The Legislature Takes a Hand, 46 N.C. L. Rav. 506

(1968).
102. 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 414 (1931).
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Alabama court looked to the substantive law of Mississippi, concluded that
the wife never had a cause of action under Mississippi law, and barred her
from recovery even though the same set of facts would have been actionable
in Alabama. This view, which applies the substantive law of the state where
the tort occurred,103 is commonly termed lex loci delicti.104 The theory
behind the place of wrong rule is that of "vested rights." This doctrine holds
that the law of the jurisdiction wherein the tort occurred creates any right
to recover. The extent of that right depends in all respects upon the law
of the place of wrong.10 5
The leading case of Emery v. Emery'0 6 was the first departure from the
traditional resolution of conflicts in the context of interspousal immunity.
The court separated the immunity problem from the tort issue. The immunity
problem, being intimately concerned with the family relationship, was more
properly determined by the law of the state of the family domicile. This was
especially true in light of the court's consideration of the place of injury
as "both fortuitous and irrelevant."' 107 The court indicated, however, that
the law of the place of wrong controlled in determining the existence of the
tort cause of action. Since this decision, several state courts0 8 have overruled
previous place of wrong holdings in favor of the lex domicilii ° 9 approach
of Emery. Some authorities have characterized the domicile rule as the
modern judicial trend,110 but it remains a minority viewpoint."' In Koplik
v. C. P. Trucking Corp.,112 the New Jersey supreme court, although it adheres

to the common law prohibition of interspousal personal injury actions,
indicated by way of dictum that it would apply the domicile rule to determine
immunities from suit and disabilities to sue. The court reasoned that a contrary ruling would allow the place of wrong rule to interfere seriously with
a status and policy of primary interest to the state of residence. This underlying theme is common to those jurisdictions that have adopted the domicile

rule. 11
A leading case advocating the domicile rule is Haumschild v. Continental
Casualty Co. 1 1 4 The accident occurred in California, which at that time
103. Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
104. Law of the place of wrong [hereinafter referred to as place of wrong rule].
105. Comment, Conflict of Laws, Torts: Florida Abandons Lex Loci Delicti, 19 U.
FLA. L. REv. 730 (1967).
106. 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
107. Id. at 427, 289 P.2d at 222.
108. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963), overruling
Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 A. 508 (1934); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis.
2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959), overruling Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342
(1931).
109. Law of the domicile [hereinafter referred to as domicile rule].
110. See, e.g., Felix, supra note 101; Jayme, supra note 101.
111. 96 A.L.R.2d 973 (1964).
112. 27 N.J.1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958).
113. See cases cited note 108 supra.
114. 7 Wis. 2d 130, 138, 95 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1959). An issue of marital annullment was
also involved, but the court ignored it in determining whether the law of the forum,
domicile, or place of wrong should control.
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prohibited interspousal suits, but the suit was brought in Wisconsin where
such suits were permitted. Furthermore, Wisconsin was the domicile. Prior to
Haumschild, Wisconsin was firmly committed to the place of wrong rule
based upon a long line of cases beginning with Buckeye v. Buckeye. 115 In an
exhaustive opinion, the Haumschild court overruled the Buckeye line of cases
and adopted the rule that "whenever the courts of this state are confronted
with a conflict of laws problem as to which law governs the capacity of one
spouse to sue the other in tort, the law to be applied is that of the state of
domicile." 1 16 While stressing that substantive tort rights would continue
to be determined by the law of the place of wrong, the court held that
capacity to sue was, from the point of view of both logic and public policy,
more properly governed by principles of family law, in which the law of
the domicile usually prevails.
The court rejected the so-called renvoi principle as leading to a "never
ending circle." 7 According to this principle, Wisconsin would have looked
to the conflict of laws principle of California, which is that the law of the
domicile controls. This would have caused the court to look back to Wisconsin
law. But Wisconsin law, under the Buckeye decision, would have referred the
court back to California under the place of wrong rule. Other jurisdictions
adopting the domicile rule have likewise avoided renvoi."18
The Haumschild decision is prototypal of the modern trend 1 9 in conflicts
involving both tort and immunity issues. This trend is also reflected in a
comparison between the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws and tentative
drafts of the Second Restatement. The First Reseatement prescribes that "[t]he
law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal
injury."'120 The Second Restatement, however, provides that the controlling
law is that of the state having "the most significant relationship with the
occurrence and with the parties ... "121 Recognizing the modern trend away
from the common law interspousal immunity rule, 2 2 the Second Restatement
specifically provides that "whether one member of a family is immune from
tort liability to another member of the family is determined by the local
law of the state of their domicile.' 23 These two separate provisions of the
tentative Second Restatement, the former governing choice-of-law for the
existence of the tort and the latter governing choice-of-law for the capacity

115. 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931).
116. 7 Wis. 2d 130, 138, 95 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1959).
117. Id. at 142, 95 N.W.2d at 820.
2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Thompson v.
118. See, e.g., Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill.
Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963).
119. See text at notes 110-11 supra.
120. RE ATEmENT OF CoNFuCr OF LAws §378 (1934).
121. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICr OF LAws (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964), cited in
Felix, supra note 101, at 430.
122. Comment, supra note 16.
123. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §390g (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964),

cited in Felix, supra note 101, at 430.
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to sue, might bring about an absurd result where the state of domicile has
little or no interest in the parties involved."'
This movement from the place of wrong rule to the domicile rule in
interspousal tort immunity reflects a general shift away from the place of
wrong rule in other areas of conflict of laws, including workman's compensation, contracts, and survival of tort rights.

125

The common themes running

through this shift have been: (1) a rejection of the inexorable application
of the place of wrong law when a state has no reasonable or relevant interest
in the particular issue involved and (2) an application of the law of some
place other than the place of wrong because the other place has "a more
2 -6
compelling interest in the application of its law to the legal issue involved. "
In this sense the interspousal immunity shift in conflicts is symptomatic of an
over-all movement in tort law conflicts toward some sort of "most significant
relationship" rule. This shift has brought some confusion to the issue of
interspousal immunity in tort conflicts and makes result prediction somewhat
more difficult, as illustrated by devolopments in Wisconsin.
Wisconsin unequivocally held in Haumschild v. Continental Casualty
Co. 1 2 7 that the domicile rule decided conflicts in immunity law. In Wilcox
v. Wilcoxy

8

however, the court adopted an interest analysis approach based

upon the policies and interests of the forum state. The court specifically held:
"[T]he law of the forum should presumptively apply unless it becomes clear
that nonforum contacts are of the greater significance."' 29 Wilcox involved
the application of conflicting guest statutes rather than immunity laws. In a
post-Wilcox decision involving choice of immunity law, Magid v. Decker"30
presented to a federal court the task of interpreting what, if anything,
Wilcox had done to the rule laid down in Haumschild. The court concluded
that Haumschild had been modified in that there might be instances in
which the domicile rule would not apply automatically. Therefore, the
interspousal immunity choice-of-law rule was not to be distinguished from
other conflicts in the sense that "a qualitative analysis of the contacts with the
states involved in light of their respective policies "1' is to be made for all
conflicting issues. But in light of the pre-Wilcox decision in Haumschild the
federal court believed that there was "strong indication that, with respect
to the specific issue of interspousal immunity, the presumption in favor of
the application of the law of the forum is overcome by the inherent claim
of the domiciliary state to vindication of its policy."" 2 The federal court
believed that Wilcox and Haumschild taken together amounted to "a mild
presumption in favor of the application of the law of the domicile of the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

For a discussion of this problem see text at notes 127-33 infra.
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
Id. at 634, 133 N.W.2d at 416.
251 F. Supp. 955 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
Id. at 959.
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 5
INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN TORT

1969]

spouses."' 33 Since the domicile of the Magid parties was Illinois, which
retained the common law immunity, the action was barred.
A reasonable solution to the problems arising out of a rigid adherence
either to the place of wrong or to the domicile rule has been articulated in
4
In this decision New Hampshire appears to have
Doiron v. Doiron."3
shifted away from a strict domicile rule in determining which immunity
law will control. At the time of the accident the spouses resided in New
Hampshire, where spouses may sue each other, but at the time the action
was initiated the spouses resided in Massachusetts, where common law
immunity prevails. The New Hampshire court recognized that this particular
fact situation was unique, but in light of their previous decision in Clark v.
Clark, $5 decided to base their choice-of-law decision upon "relevant choiceinfluencing considerations."' 36 In other words, a form of interest analysis
37
was adopted. The court specified five considerations:
(1) predictability of results;
(2) maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good relationship
among the States in our federal system;
(3) simplification of the judicial task;
(4) advancement by the court of its own State's governmental interests rather than those of other States;
(5) the Court's preference for what it regards as the sounder rule
of law, as between the two competing ones.
It was stressed that while the domicile was of great importance, the place of
injury was also of considerable importance. The court decided, after an
analysis based upon the above five considerations, that New Hampshire law
controlled because New Hampshire was the domicile at the time of the
accident and therefore had the most relevant contacts. The approach in
Doiron is recommended as the best solution to choice-of-law problems arising
with the abrogation of the common law immunity rule. A rigid application
of the domicile rule can be as unworkable as the rigid application of the
place of wrong rule.
The ease with which choice-of-law confusion can occur has been recently
illustrated in Schwartz v. Schwartz.13 8 New York domicilaries were vacationing in Arizona when the husband, who was driving a rented Arizona automobile, negligently injured his wife. Since Arizona prohibited interspousal
suits while New York permitted them, a choice of law problem arose as to
which rule to apply. Plaintiff wife urged that the theories of "most significant relationship, center of gravity or grouping of contacts" made New York
law applicable. The court pointed out that it had been unable to locate any
case where the court of the state where the tort was committed applied the
13.

Id.

134. 241 A.2d 572 (N.H. 1968).
135. 107 N.H. 551, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
136. 241 A.2d 372, 373 (N.H. 1968).
157. Id.
138. 7 Ariz. App. 445, 440 P.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1968).
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law of the domicile and noted that in previous cases 139 the place of domicile
and forum had been the same, rather than place of wrong and forum coinciding as in the present action. It was then asserted that "under almost any
theory," 140 apparently meaning any of the theories that plaintiff wife was
urging, Arizona had the most significant contacts with the occurrence. The
confusing aspect of the decision is that the court did not specify whether
the basis of its application of Arizona law was a "most significant relationship"
theory or the traditional place of wrong rule. Should common law interspousal immunity be abolished in Florida, a forthright adoption of an interest
analysis approach to choice-of-law problems would avoid some of the problems
that have plagued other states abolishing the immunity rule.
Because of Florida's dogged adherence to the immunity rule, there are
no reported Florida decisions in which out-of-state spouses have raised a
choice-of-law problem concerning immunity. This is perhaps because an
out-of-state couple would tend to bring suit in their domicile state if that
1
state permitted such suits. 41

Nevertheless, Florida has considered a choice-of-law problem concerning
wrongful death statutes.142 In its initial decision the Florida supreme court
abandoned the traditional place of wrong rule and adopted a form of interest
analysis. On rehearing, however, the court in a 4-3 decision reversed its
initial position, 1 43 holding that the place of wrong is the primary factor in
determining "the legal effect to be accorded any occurrence upon which a
cause of action depends.' 44 The court thus implied that other factors may
be considered together with the place of wrong, 14 5 but no enumeration of
specific factors was attempted.
In Messinger v. Tom146 the Second District Court of Appeal faced the

task of allocating the weight to be given the place of wrong rule in Florida.
Plaintiff's mother was killed when a car, which she owned and in which she
was a passenger, struck a bridge abutment in North Carolina. The plaintiff,
his mother, and the driver of the automobile were all residents of Florida.
The automobile was registered and garaged in Florida. The guardians of
plaintiff were Florida residents and the estates of plaintiff's mother and the
driver were administered by Florida courts. The trip, destined for Washington,
D. C., originated and was to terminate in Florida. Florida thus had an
overwhelming interest in the parties. The only interest of North Carolina
in the transaction was that the accident chanced to occur on the soil of that
139. The court cited: Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963);
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
140. 7 Ariz. App. 445, 448, 440 P.2d 326, 329 (Ct. App. 1968).
141. E.g., Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966) (wife injured by
husband in automobile accident in Florida, but husband's estate was sued in Illinois, the
domicile state).
142. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
143. Id. at 749.
144. Id. at 752.
145. See also Comment, Floridaand Lex Loci Delicti, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 730, 734 (1967)
(editor's note).
146. 203 So. 2d 357 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
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state. No parties from outside the state of Florida were even remotely
concerned with plantiff's wrongful death action against the executrix of the
driver's estate.
The conflict of laws problem arose between the Florida and North
Carolina wrongful death statutes. Florida allows the minor child to recover
for the death of a parent when there is no surviving spouse,347 but North
Carolina allows an action for wrongful death to be brought only by a
representative of decedent's estate. 148 The fact that all of the parties were
citizens of Florida provided sufficient reason for suing in Florida. Implicit
in the decision, however, is an additional reason for preferring that the action
be brought by the minor in Florida rather than by a representative of the
decedent's estate in North Carolina. Florida permits the minor to recover
damages for loss of "'support, care, comfort, counsel, companionship, protection, estate, education, moral training and love of his mother.' ,19 North
Carolina has a restrictive, pecuniary-loss-to-estate measure of damages that
excludes many factors for which a minor may be compensated in Florida. 50
Faced with the Florida supreme court's ruling that the place of wrong was
the primary factor for consideration in choice of law situations,' 51 the district
court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the cause on the ground that the
law of the place of wrong governed. 52 This decision allows the place of
wrong rule to interfere with an important public policy of Florida and demonstrates the harsh results of a rigid adherence to the place of wrong rule.
The interest analysis approach to choice-of-law problems advocated by the
Florida supreme court in their initial decision of Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.15 3 would have avoided the Messinger result. The Florida supreme
court in Hopkins showed itself receptive to the interest analysis approach to
conflicts, and it would be prudent for the court to return to that approach
when again confronted with a choice of law dilemma.
CONCLUSION

The common law rule of interspousal immunity was developed by courts
in response to historical and social circumstances having little relationship
to the urban, industrial society of today. The steady historical trend has
been toward placing husband and wife on an arms-length basis in their
legal dealings with each other. Legislation such as the Married Women's
Property Acts has chipped away the conceptual underpinning of the rule.

147. FLA. STAT. §§768.01-.02 (1967).
148. Messinger v. Tom, 203 So. 2d 357, 358 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967); N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§28-173 (1966).
149. Messinger v. Tom, 203 So. 2d 357, 358 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
150. Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952) (the value of the life of a
thirty-three year old mother of two children held to be worth $4,000).
151. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743, 752 (Fla. 1967).
152. In Lescard v. Keel, 211 So. 2d 868 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968), the court again expressed
the view that Florida is a place of wrong jurisdiction.
153. 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
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The reasons used by the courts to support this moribund rule seem specious
and are utilized ex post facto to support what is intuitively felt by some
courts to be better policy. Since the judiciary in Florida has expressed a
strong unwillingness to remove this anomaly, the state legislature should do
so clearly and without hesitation. The ground for abolition is that this
remnant of the common law is incompatible with both the spirit and letter
of the new Florida constitution. This is particularly so in light of the
54
emphasis that the new constitution places upon interspousal equality.
Although the abolition of the rule, together with the high number of transients in the state, would undoubtedly create a conflict of laws problem, this
problem may be controlled by the Florida supreme court's adoption of a
choice-of-law rule based upon interest analysis. The immunity rule has outlived its usefulness, and it is time for the legislature to act.
FRED W.

POPE, JR.

154. See notes 73, 74, 79 supra.
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